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The Democratic Peace Unraveled: It’s the Economy  
 
Recent research indicates that the democratic peace—the observation that democratic nations 
rarely fight each other—is spurious: that advanced capitalism accounts for both democracy and 
the democratic peace (Mousseau 2009). This is not a trivial prospect: if economic conditions 
explain the democratic peace, then a great deal of research on governing institutions and foreign 
policy is probably obsolete. This study addresses all the recent defenses of the democratic peace 
and reports new results using a new measure that directly gauges the causal mechanism of 
contract flows dependent on third-party enforcement. Analyses of most nations from 1961 to 
2001 show contract-intensive ―impersonal‖ economy to be the second most powerful variable in 
international conflict—following only contiguity—and, once considered, there is no evidence of 
causation from democracy to peace. It is impersonal economy, not democracy or unfettered 
markets, which appears to explain the democratic peace. 3 
 
The democratic peace—the observation that democratic nations rarely, if ever, fight each other, 
even though they often fight non-democratic nations—is easily the most significant research 
program in the study of international politics, with over three hundred books and articles 
published on the topic over the past two decades. This attention is warranted because the 
democratic peace has been one of the most illuminating clues we have had for comprehending the 
workings of international politics. It has also endured many challenges, so many that some have 
expressed a reluctance to accept evidence against it (e.g. Dafoe 2011: 14; Weede 2011: 5). 
Yet in recent years a new challenge to the democratic peace has emerged: the ―capitalist‖ 
peace (Schneider and Gleditsch 2010). There are two kinds of capitalist peace theories. Free 
market theories are in the neo-classical liberal framework, broadly defined, as they assume that 
unfettered markets are the primary source of wealth, and identify peace among advanced 
capitalist states resulting from less government ownership of property or less government 
regulation, including regulation of foreign trade and investment (Weede 1996, 2011; Gartzke et 
al. 2001; McDonald 2009). My own economic norms theory, in contrast, makes no neo-classical 
liberal assumption regarding the spontaneity of markets; in its application to international 
relations it can be said to predict a ―capitalist‖ peace because it identifies how economies where 
most actors pursue wealth in the market have common interests (Mousseau 2000). In contrast to 
the free-market theories, economic norms theory disregards regulatory policies and highlights 
instead socioeconomic conditions, and thus can be called ―social-market‖ theory (Mousseau 
2009). 
While the evidence today links free markets and social markets with peace, only the social-
market economic peace offers both an explanation for why advanced capitalism and democracy 
go together as well as corroborative evidence for it.
1 The basic argument is simple: because only 
impersonal forms of contracts require third-party enforcement, only economies where most 
actors pursue wealth in the market require the impersonal democratic state to ensure the unbiased 
credibility of contract enforcement; in personalist economies individuals rely mostly on personal 
trust and thus have little need for an impersonal state (Mousseau 2000). Moreover, dependency 
on an impersonal market means dependency on the health and welfare of all others in the market, 
and since others in the market can be both inside and outside a nation, and because the 
robustness of a market depends on the credibility of the commitments of its members, 
dependency on a market makes war, even the threat of any significant form of violence, virtually 
impossible, within and among nations.  
With the causal mechanism of impersonal economy assessed directly with a binary indicator 
of impersonal contracting within nations, I have reported (Mousseau 2012a) showed that nations 
with impersonal economies do not have armed civil conflicts, let alone wars, and corroborated 
(Mousseau 2009) prior predictions (2000; 2002) of a peace among nations with impersonal 
economies—and consideration of this peace renders the democratic peace insignificant. This 
economic peace is also far more substantial than the democratic one: while the democratic peace 
achieved fame with its claim of an absence of wars among democratic nations—with ―wars‖ 
defined as militarized conflicts with at least one thousand battlefield-connected fatalities—the 4 
 
social-market capitalist peace boasts an absence of wars and the absence of a single battlefield-
connected fatality among nations with impersonal economies. 
This economic challenge to the democratic peace has not gone uncontested. Russett has 
speculated that democracy might be revived if control is added for regime differences (2010: 
201); Dafoe offers that the moderate correlation of democracy with impersonal economy means 
only that impersonal economy is a conditional, rather than a confounding, variable in the 
democratic peace; and that democracy survives if the democracy measure is made far more 
restrictive (2011: 3).  
This study re-examines the economic challenge to the democratic peace by examining all 
claims against it. New analyses of most nations from 1961 to 2001 are carried out. First, a new 
continuous measure of impersonal economy is introduced, providing a solution to the perfect 
prediction problem that results from the perfect correlation between the binary measure of 
impersonal economy and peace in analyses of fatal militarized interstate disputes. Second, 
crucial tests are performed with analyses of all militarized conflicts, not just fatal ones, to see if 
the new binary maximum measure of democracy (Polity +10), put forward by Dafoe (2011), can 
save the democratic peace hypothesis. Third, key tests include control for differences along the 
democracy-autocracy dimension, to see if this dimension may explain the insignificance of the 
democratic peace. Finally, the impact of impersonal economy is examined in head-to-head tests 
with alternative ―free market‖ measures of capitalist peace. The results are clear and clean: once 
impersonal economy is taken into account, there is no evidence of causation from democracy or 
free-market capitalism to peace; it is far more likely that impersonal economy accounts for both 
democracy and peace.  
The democratic peace is well known and need not be reviewed here, so I begin below by 
differentiating the two kinds of capitalist peace theories: free market and social market.
2 In the 
following section the issue of whether the capitalist peace can account for the democratic peace 
is discussed, setting the stage for the analyses of the following section. The implications of the 
test results are not trivial: The role of democracy as a factor in international politics must be 
earnestly reconsidered, as it is impersonal economy, not democracy or free markets, which 
appears to cause the phenomena known as democratic peace. 
 
TWO APPROACHES TO CAPITALIST PEACE 
 
The Free-Market Peace 
 
Neo-classical liberal theory claims that markets emerge spontaneously (Hayek 1976), and wealth 
has long been associated with liberal democracy (Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994). Weede links 
these strands of thought to argue that the democratic peace is no more than ―a mere component 
of the capitalist peace‖ (2011: 2), with capitalism and unfettered markets assumed as 
―synonyms‖ (ibid. footnote 1). Alternatively, Gartzke and colleagues (2001) have shown how 
less regulated trade across borders can avert war. With the neo-classical assumption that open 
capital markets cause capital flows, it follows that nations with open capital markets are more 5 
 
likely than others to pay a cost when making a militarized threat—the cost of capital fleeing the 
risk of war. Nations that bear this cost signal their resolve, increasing the likelihood of their 
adversaries accommodating their demands and averting war.  
McDonald (2009) defines ―capitalism‖ as private property, with capitalist nations those 
whose states possess less property than others. Public ownership is assumed to generate revenue 
for states, freeing them from raising taxes and thus freeing them from garnering public support in 
waging foreign wars. Assuming all foreign policy decision makers know this fact, the 
commitments of nations with smaller portions of their economies owned by the state are thought 
to be more credible than the commitments of leaders of nations with larger public sectors. Fearon 
has shown how credibility of commitments may affect the probability of wars between nations 
(1995).  
  There is some evidence in support of these views: Gartzke links free markets with peace 
(2005); Gartzke and colleagues (2001; 2007) report financial openness among states to be 
negatively associated with militarized conflict; and McDonald reports that nations with larger 
public sectors are more likely than others to be in militarized conflict (2009). There is a possible 
weakness in all these claims, however: in every cause the contributors claim to be explaining the 
peace among the advanced prosperous nations (Garzke 2007: 166; McDonald 2007: 569; Weede 
2011: 2), relying on the neo-classical assumption, sometimes only implicitly, that advanced 
economy is caused primarily by free and unfettered markets. However, none offer evidence for 
this key link in the causal chain, and the general state of evidence is not supportive: while the 
association with unfettered markets with wealth may be widely intuitive in some Western 
cultures, in fact most evidence links prosperity not with unfettered markets but with state policies 
of intervention and economic redistribution (Gurr et al. 1990; Sachs 2006); and there is no 
significant correlation of free markets with wealth (Mousseau 2012b).  
The free-market theories are all firmly in the mainstream tradition in the study of 
international relations that treats anarchy exogenously and assumes an inherently competitive 
world where states with the monopoly in violence are the primary actors. Because war is costly, it 
is thought that war does not pay, and thus war is thought to occur by mishap, resulting from weak 
information or from an inability of nations to credibly commit to peace (Keohane and Martin 
1995; Fearon 1995). In this way, nations with free markets are assumed to be in perpetual conflict 
like everybody else, they are just better at avoiding escalations to militarized conflict. Violence is 
averted not because of common interests but because it is not profitable, or free markets yield 
better information (Gartzke et al 2001) or make foreign policy commitments more credible 
(McDonald 2009). As we will see below, the social-market economic peace makes none of these 
assumptions. 
 
The Social-Market Peace 
 
The social-market model of capitalist peace is deduced from my own economic norms theory 
(Mousseau 2000, 2009), which starts with the observation, widely documented by economic 
historians (Polanyi 1957[1944]; North et al. 2009), of two kinds of economies in history: 6 
 
impersonal and personal. In impersonal economies citizens normally obtain goods and services 
contracting with strangers in the marketplace, with trust in contractual commitments largely 
dependent on the credibility of third-party enforcement. In personalist economies, in contrast, 
individuals are comparatively more dependent on personal relationships, as individuals give or 
withhold favors, or trust in contractual commitments, in light of prior interactions with 
individuals they know personally. 
  Personalist economies have encompassed most of human history and characterize the 
economies of many nations today (North et al. 2009; Hicken 2011). A well-known historical 
example is European feudalism, where client serfs pledged loyalty, including military service, to 
patron vassals in exchange for economic and physical security, with vassals in turn pledging 
their loyalty to patron lords, and so on. Most contracting that did occur in feudal Europe did not 
require third-party enforcement mechanisms, as trust usually rested instead on personal ties or, 
among strangers, taking the form of spot trades and thus without any need for third-party 
enforcement (Kohn 2003).  
Wealth in feudal Europe was based primarily on land, but in many developing countries 
today, where the market remains comparatively peripheral to everyday life, clientelist 
relationships are more likely to be centered on accessing state-rents (Hicken 2011: 303). Rather 
than manors and fiefs, clientelist-oriented groups take a variety of forms, including tribes, clans, 
neighborhood associations, gangs, mafias, labor unions, religious sects, and political parties. For 
instance, in an extended family a cousin may do all the electrical work, an uncle may do all 
injections, and an aunt active in a political party may find local government jobs for various 
family members—all of whom are obligated in turn to take care of fellow family members, and 
all family members are obligated to serve her political party as asked, including showing up at 
rallies. Crucial for the reciprocity of clientelist political economy to work, representatives of 
patrons continuously monitor the behavioral loyalty of their clients (ibid.: 292-93). 
  Economic norms theory assumes everybody in all societies seeks goods and services, 
highlighting that the way goods and services are sought differs according to socio-economy: in 
impersonal economies the dominant strategy is to contract with strangers located in the 
marketplace; in personalist economies the dominant strategy is to nourish personal relationships 
and participate in group struggles over state rents. These divergent strategies for obtaining 
wealth create divergent individual-level interests, preferences, and outlooks, generating novel 
insights on the origins of liberal preferences, strong states, democracy and, in anarchic systems, 
dyadic alignments and rivalries (Mousseau 2000, 2009). 
First and foremost, only an impersonal economy, not a personalist one, requires a strong 
state. Individuals cannot automatically trust the commitments of strangers, so an impersonal 
economy cannot exist unless the commitments in contracts are widely credible. Third-party 
enforcement mechanisms can be private (e.g., notaries) or public (government). However, the 
private enforcement of contracts is costly, so individuals dependent on an impersonal market 
have an interest in an authority that offers the enforcement of contracts as a public good. For an 
authority’s commitment of contract enforcement to be credible, however, it must have the 
monopoly on violence over a fixed and declared geographic space. It must also build and 7 
 
maintain bureaucracies and court systems that are capable of reaching and protecting the contract 
rights of every actor in the marketplace. In this way, when exogenous factors render the benefits 
of the impersonal market greater than the benefits of personal ties, members of a society develop 
an interest their state effectively and efficiently enforcing contracts. 
Where the dominant strategy is to pursue goods and services in personal ties, in contrast, 
there is little benefit from a strong state. Utility is maximized primarily with loyalty to patrons 
who distribute economic and physical protection with partiality according to loyalty, rank, and 
service to the group. Patrons, having the loyalty of clients, have the capacity to wage violence; 
order in these societies is maintained with gift exchanges among patrons that reinforce paths of 
hierarchy and loyalty among them, as in European feudalism. For those not in groups that control 
the state, the state is an oppressive force to be evaded; for those privileged in groups with ties to 
the state, utility is maximized with loyalty to personalities, not the state.  
A second change in preferences resulting from an exogenous rise in impersonal economy is 
for legal equality. For a contract to be credible all parties to it must be equally obligated to its 
terms. Therefore states that wish to promote impersonal economy must have not only the 
capacity to protect the contract rights of every actor in the market, but they must also do so with 
renowned credibility. States wishing to promote markets must therefore construct bureaucracies 
and court systems that are not only effective and efficient, but also widely recognized as 
impartial. In personalist economies, in contrast, such credibility is irrelevant, since utility is 
normally maximized with personal ties and rankings in group hierarchies. For those in groups 
tied to the state, an impartial and transparent bureaucracy and court system is an economic threat 
that must be undermined.  
In these ways, the impersonal state may be an epiphenomenon of impersonal economy: for 
the commitments of contracts to be widely credible a state must first exist, and then it must be 
widely respected as capable and impartial. Property rights theorists reverse this causation, 
claiming that the state enforcement of contracts is enough to promote contract flows (Clague et 
al. 1999). Like neo-classical theorists (Hayek 1976) and many in the modern discipline of 
Economics, property rights theorists assume that markets emerge spontaneously and, related with 
this assumption, that a dearth of contracting generally indicates a dearth of economic flows of 
any kind. In contrast, economic norms theory places property rights theory and even the modern 
field of Economics as special cases of economic norms theory: when a society has market norms, 
inefficiencies in the state’s enforcement of contracts will increase transaction costs, since most 
most exchanges are contractual in nature. But if a society is characterized with personalist 
exchanges, any improvement in state enforcement of contracts is largely irrelevant, as most 
exchanges are personal in nature and thus third-party enforcement plays little role in the 
economy. For property rights theorists and others, governing institutions affect economic 
conditions; in economic norms theory political leaders can decide to promote impersonal 
economy, but it is economic conditions that primarily affect governing as well as social 
institutions. 
Once impersonal economy is correctly understood as a variable rather than a constant, it is 
easy to see the third way preferences can change with a rise in contract flows: a rise in 8 
 
impersonal economy can promote an interest in freedom. For anyone dependent on the 
impersonal marketplace, a larger market offers more opportunities than a smaller one. Individuals 
seeking wealth in the market thus have interests not only in their own freedom to contract, but 
also in the freedom of everyone else to contract. There is no apparent reason to limit this interest 
to one’s own ethnic group, religious sect, or nation. Citizens in impersonal economies thus have 
interests not only in their states protecting individual rights at home, but in their states promoting 
the rights of others abroad.
3 For individuals seeking wealth in personal ties, in contrast, there is 
no apparent interest in the freedom of strangers, because there is little to be gained from strangers 
located in a market; nor is there much interest in one’s own freedom because for tactical reasons 
the incentive is to at least appear to conform with alacrity to group norms and values. 
While the economic norms model as presented thus far has assumed instrumental 
rationality—that citizens identify their interests based on the information available to them—the 
theory works just as well, perhaps better, with the recognition of bounded rationality (Mousseau 
2009: 58). Introduced by Herbert Simon in the 1950s, bounded rationality draws on the fact that 
it is not rational to be rational: many goals can be reached more efficiently by forming decision 
making habits, or heuristics, for situations that arise routinely (Simon 1955). As applied here, 
individuals routinely dependent on trusting strangers in contract will develop the habits of 
trusting strangers and preferring universal freedom and rights, and strong and impartial states for 
protecting these rights. Individuals in personalist economies will develop the habits of trusting 
and caring for others within their in-groups, abiding by the commands of patrons, and distrusting 
those from out-groups, including their states. In this way, citizens in impersonal economies will 
perceive an interest in freedom and democracy and promoting these institutions for everyone, 
even though most, acting on bounded norms rather than on instrumental rationality, do not know 
why they have these universalistic liberal values. Individuals in personalist economies, in 
contrast, will be comparatively more susceptible to the appeals of those who offer strong in-
group identities and warn against the threats of outsiders, even though most, acting on bounded 
norms rather than on instrumental rationality, do not know why they are susceptible to such fears 
or why they place such great value in loyalty to their groups and group leaders. 
In these ways, it is easy to see how a rise in impersonal economy can legitimate liberal 
democratic institutions—and also why nations with impersonal ―capitalist‖ economies will be in 
peace. James Fearon has highlighted that, because interstate war is costly, there should always be 
peaceful solution that both sides prefer to fighting (1995). This deduction requires, however, the 
unitary actor assumption (ibid.: 379). Drawing on Fearon’s instructive framing, economic norms 
theory can show how war can be preferred when at least one side has a personalist economy.  
Recall that personalist political economy is zero-sum like: a gain in state rents for one group 
must always equal a loss for another. It follows that ruling groups within nations—whether 
democratically elected or not—have little incentive to produce public goods, preferring the 
distribution of private goods to supporters. In this way, foreign war can serve two purposes. 
First, it can be in the economic interests of the ruling coalition of in-groups, with its costs 
imposed on repressed out-groups. Iraq in the 1980s serves as an example: hundreds of thousands 
from all groups died in its wars for territory (against Iran) and oil (against Kuwait and others), 9 
 
but the primary economic beneficiaries of these wars were to be the clans and tribes of the ruling 
coalition. A role for public goods provision in interstate conflict has been highlighted by Bueno 
de Mesquita et al. (1999). While democracy might mitigate the constraints on public goods 
provision, economic norms theory predicts this constraint from economic rather than democratic 
institutions. 
The second motive for war for clientelist nations is as a means for ruling group coalitions to 
stay in power. Because individuals are normally loyal to their groups, not their states, personalist 
states tend to lack widespread legitimacy and are thus less stable than impersonal states. In 
addition, the zero-sum nature of their political economies means that ruling groups must 
continuously seek wealth for supporters and, as a consequence, repress out-groups who can be 
allotted few if any state rents. Yet repression is costly. To reduce this cost many state leaders 
have learned to play on personalist bounded norms by propagandizing the state as an in-group 
patron providing economic and physical security to all: that is, ruling groups have learned to 
foster nationalism. Nationalist identities, however, require an out-group. The most convenient 
and successful way to foster a nationalist identity is to maintain a quarrel with another state. 
Because most borders have been adjusted at some point in history, border disputes are simple and 
convenient to concoct—and in this way economic norms theory predicts enduring rivalries 
among personalist states that share land borders.  
Impersonal economy, in contrast, is positive-sum like: any improvement in the welfare of 
anyone else in the market increases the odds that one’s own welfare will improve. Everyone in 
the market thus has a principal interest in the public good of ever expanding growth in the 
market. While some individuals might rank some other preference or preferences higher than 
market growth, more individuals rank market growth at or near the top of their preference 
ordering than they do any other preference, and as a result the voter preference for market 
growth is Pareto optimal: in an impersonal political economy there is no other preference that a 
citizenry, as a group, will rank higher. Since impersonal states are largely democratic, successful 
political parties have learned that performance in fostering market growth, rather than the 
promotion of fears of others, is the winning strategy for staying in power. While nationalist, 
religious, and other identity issues may at times exist, the dearth of collective bounded norms 
means that these issues are almost always outweighed by constituent demands for market 
growth. Economic norms theory thus offers what could be vital conditionality to diversionary 
theories of war-making (Levy 1988): nations with impersonal economies may be immune from 
this malady. 
It follows that among neighbors with impersonal economies, the main purpose of borders is 
not to distinguish national or cultural identities, which can cross borders, but to determine which 
state is tasked with enforcing contracts in a region. The settlement of border disputes is thus akin 
to the settlement of trade disputes: since each state foremost desires economic growth, a peaceful 
resolution is always reached, as there is always a set of negotiated settlements that both sides 
prefer to fighting. Nor are disputes of any kind allowed to linger: uncertainty inhibits market 
growth, so when disputes among impersonal states do arise they are predicted to be resolved not 
only peaceably but also quickly. 10 
 
The social-market economic peace is more than just a dearth of conflict, however: these 
states have common foreign policy interests. Successful political parties of impersonal states 
have learned to promote exports to enhance market growth, and in this way nations with 
impersonal economies share a common interest in the vitality of the global marketplace. 
Personalist states, because they are most interested in the distribution of private goods to 
supporters, are comparatively less interested in promoting the public good of market growth and, 
as a consequence, have comparatively less interest in the global market.
4 There are two 
implications from this insight. First, to enhance the credibility of contractual commitments a 
market requires law and order, which is vital for contractual commitments to have credibility. In 
this way, impersonal states fundamentally agree that any actor, state or non-state, that threatens 
global order must be opposed; if violations are unopposed the credibility of contractual 
commitments can become suspect, increasing the risk of global divestment and economic 
contraction. Second, because growth in the global market is a public good for everyone in the 
market, there can be few relative gains concerns among impersonalist states; in fact each has an 
interest in the health and well being of all others in the market. The upshot is that impersonal 
states not only avoid militarized conflict with each other: they are in natural alliance. 
 
CAN A CAPITALIST PEACE TRUMP THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE? 
 
A relationship may be spurious when we have reason to believe a third variable may account for 
both the explanans and the explanandum (Blalock 1979:468-474; Thompson and Tucker 1997: 
434-435; Ray 2003). In the democratic peace research program many variables are estimated in 
regression models, but are not potentially confounding because they are not accompanied with 
theory that offers an account for both the explanans (democracy) and the explanandum 
(militarized interstate conflict). Examples include alliances, relative capability, and contiguity. 
Of the three free-market capitalist peace theories, only one explicitly offers an explanation 
for democracy: as discussed above, Weede argues that if free markets promote prosperity, and 
prosperity promotes democracy, than free markets can be the ultimate cause of the democratic 
peace (1996; 2011). However, there is little evidence for this key link in the causal chain: in fact 
most research links wealth not with unfettered markets but with state spending and redistribution 
policies (Gurr et al. 1990; Sachs 2006); nor is it clear that wealth causes democracy: there is no 
consensus on explaining this tie, and even the observation is under challenge (Acemoglu et al. 
2008). Adherents of the other two free-market theories have claimed that their capitalist 
variables either account for the democratic peace (Gartzke 2007), or are stronger than it 
(McDonald 2009), but both of these lack theory for how free markets can cause democracy. 
Absent some mechanism for how a factor might explain democracy, it is not logical to interpret a 
result as confounding, because it could just as well be reflecting reverse causation, with 
democracy causing the free-market variables (Blalock 1979: 474). Despite the lack of theory, 
Gartzke (2007) reports overturning the democratic peace with a measure of capital openness 
between nations; others have since reported that this result is due to errors in sampling and 11 
 
specification, with democracy ultimately surviving (Choi 2011; Dafoe 2011; see also Russett 
2010). 
  In contrast to the free-market models, the social-market model explains precisely how 
impersonal economy can cause both democracy and peace, with further evidence corroborating 
this path of causation: it is impersonal economy, not development per se, that predicts 
democratic transitions (Mousseau 2012c). Moreover, direct data on contracting yields a perfect 
prediction of no fatal militarized conflicts between two nations with impersonal economies, 
while democratic dyads where neither state is capitalist are not in peace (ibid.). However, these 
tests did not include control for regime differences, and differences in regime along the 
democracy-autocracy dimension have been shown to be associated with conflict (Werner and 
Lemke 1997). According to economic norms theory, regime difference is partly explained by 
impersonal economy and is thus endogenous and should not be considered in tests of the theory 
(Blalock 1979:468-474; Ray 2003). However, as discussed above, Russett speculates that 
inclusion of this control might revive democracy as a force for peace (2010: 201); so below this 
possibility is examined. 
  Dafoe offers two reasons democracy must still be considered a force for peace even with the 
results of Mousseau (2009) (2011; see also Russett 2010:201). First, he claims that the measure 
of impersonal economy only conditions, rather than confounds, the democratic peace, because 
74% democratic dyads in the tests contain at least one state with an impersonal economy, and all 
these dyads were linked with peace (the 26% of democratic dyads where no state has an 
impersonal economy were not significantly linked with peace). Unfortunately, Dafoe does not 
explain how these results show causation, even if only conditional, from democracy to peace. 
Moreover, this conclusion can be reached only by ignoring the evidentiary implications of the 
regression at hand, which reports a corroborated novel prediction of a theory and thus joins a 
large stream of evidence in support of economic norms theory, and this theory clearly predicts 
democratic transitions and peace without any reliance on democracy itself as an independent 
causal factor in the peace.   
The second reason Dafoe offers that Mousseau (2009) does not overturn the democratic 
peace is that, upon analyzing Mousseau’s data, he reports that if a new and highly stringent 
binary measure of democracy is adopted instead, with democracies defined as only those at the 
highest possible Polity score of +10, that it too, like Mousseau’s binary measure of impersonal 
economy, yields a perfect prediction of an absence of fatal militarized disputes (2011: 3). Since 
perfect prediction yields quasi-complete separation in the offending variable, it is impossible to 
tell from a regression which factor, impersonal economy or democracy, is the more likely cause 
of the peace.  
As far as I know, the Polity+10 measure has not previously been applied to the democratic 
peace; it is also an explicit post-hoc response to my challenge to the democratic peace. This is 
not to imply that changing a measure after-the-fact is necessarily improper: knowledge can 
sometimes progress with post-hoc adjustments to theories and measures. The weakness of theory 
informing us how to measure democracy—itself an indication of the comparatively poor quality 
of many of the democratic peace theories—does encourage experimentation with the measure. 12 
 
Rather, my point here is that scientific procedure calls for recognition that post-hoc adjustments 
to measures can go on ad infinitum, ultimately rendering a theory or hypothesis unfalsifiable. 
This was the problem Lakatos sought to address as he developed a standard for gauging 
emendations to research programs (1978[1970]). Using Lakatosian standards widely used in the 
field of International Relations (e.g. James 2002), Dafoe’s post-hoc adjustment in the measure of 
democracy is clearly degenerating, since he offered no excess empirical content obtained from 
the emendation, and his explicit motivation was to save the democratic peace hypothesis. A 
move to +10 democracy also brings with it the troubling question of whether all the studies of 
democratic peace over the past two decades would have obtained the same levels of significance 
if the +10 measure had been adopted, given that it would have left far fewer democratic dyads in 
the samples. For this reason, Lakatos would consider Dafoe’s finding with Polity+10 democracy 
trivial and uninteresting (Lakatos 1978[1970]: 87-88).  
The analyses below revisit the democracy and capitalism debate. Because it is already known 
that the free-market models do not overturn the democratic peace (McDonald 2009; Choi 2011; 
Dafoe 2011), the tests begin by addressing the recent defenses of the democratic peace in light of 
the social-market model (Mousseau 2009), followed by tests including the free-market variables. 
 
ANALYTIC PROCEDURES  
 
The analyses are constructed in accordance with the standard procedures used in the democratic 
peace research program. The unit of analysis is the non-directional dyad-year, with militarized 
conflicts identified as the original (day one) disputants in the conflict as codified in the 
Correlates of War Militarized Interstate Dispute data set (Ghosn, Palmer and Bremer 2004).
5 
Following the general trend in conflict studies, to save space I primarily report results of 
analyses of fatal militarized interstate disputes, since non-fatal disputes are more likely than fatal 
ones to be unreported (Mousseau et al. 2003: 291), and because Mousseau (2009) analyzed fatal 
disputes. Still, all the analyses were repeated with all militarized disputes (fatal and non-fatal) 
with almost identical results (the only exception is noted below). Data for most variables were 
obtained using the EUGene data generation program, version 3.204 (Bennett and Stam 2000). 
Like the dependent variables, most of the independent variables are conventional to the conflict 
studies literature, so to save space their theoretical justifications can be reviewed elsewhere 
(Russett and Oneal 2001; Mousseau et al. 2003) and data sources and measures are listed at the 
bottom of Tables 1 and 2. The exception is the measure for impersonal economy, which is 
discussed at length below. All data are available for replication purposes at 
www.http/anonymous. 
 
Measuring Impersonal Economy 
 
Economic norms theory pinpoints causation originating in micro-level dependency on an 
impersonal market. Dependency on contracting with strangers located in the impersonal market 
creates an interest in an impersonal state that credibly and reliably enforces contracts as well as 13 
 
an interest in the health and well-being of strangers in the market, rendering war against anyone 
in the market too costly to carry out (Mousseau 2000). Yet not all contracting implies 
dependency on an impersonal state: many contracts take the form of spot trades, where goods are 
fully exchanged at one time and place and thus require no third-party enforcement; other 
contracts are personalized in form, with credibility in commitments resting to some extent on 
personal trust among the contractees.  
The ideal measure of dependency on an impersonal market would therefore be a count of 
actual contracts, and include only those contracts that require third-party enforcement. 
Fortunately such data are available: contracts in life insurance. Life insurance contracts cannot 
take the form of spot trades because the commitments of insurers must occur after the 
commitments of policyholders. They cannot rest on personal trust among contractees, and the 
threat of the loss of future contracts in the event an insurer fails to fulfill its commitments, 
because the delivery of service is expected only after the relationship ends with the death of the 
policyholder. Perhaps most importantly, because the purpose of a life insurance contract is to 
promote the economic security of one’s closest family members, data on life insurance 
contracting is a seemingly direct a gauge of the theorized causality of micro-level economic 
dependency on an impersonal market. 
Data on life insurance have been compiled under the auspices of the World Bank (Beck and 
Webb 2003) and are available for 64 of the 157 nations identified as sovereign by the Correlates 
of War Project (Small and Singer 1982) and otherwise available for analysis.
6 To assuage 
concern that the test results below may be due to a bias caused by missing data, I follow the 
recommendation of Gary King and colleagues and report results with missing values estimated 
using secondary data (2001; see also Gleditsch 2002). Missing values are not a blank slate: we 
know a great deal about political economies from a variety of sources, and personal and 
impersonal economies are very different from one another in a number of dimensions. Tests 
confirm that the following variables yield an imputed measure that correlates at 0.97 with the 
original data: per capita private consumption (kc) and investment (ki); ratios of kc and ki to 
foreign trade; energy consumption per capita; communist economy; post-communist economy; 
oil-export dependency; population; and various controls for regions and sample size variations 
that occur over time. The extremely high correlation of the predicted measure with the original 
data indicates that the imputed values yield a highly reliable estimate of the missing values. I call 
the variable of life insurance contracts in force, measured as the natural log of U.S. dollars per 





Model 1 in Table 1 reports the null model of democratic peace in analyses of fatal militarized 
interstate disputes as reported in multiple studies. As expected, the coefficient for DemocracyL (-
0.06) is negative and significant at the standard 0.05 threshold. Since this variable indicates the 
level of democracy of the state with the lower level of democracy in the dyad (subscript L for 
lower), high values mean both states are highly democratic and this coefficient corroborates the 14 
 
democratic peace. All remaining variables perform as expected, as in prior studies, and need not 
be reviewed here. 
Model 2 presents new knowledge by adding the control for impersonal economy. To capture 
the dyadic expectation of peace among impersonalist nations, the variable Contract-Intensive 
EconomyL (CIEL) indicates the value of impersonal contracts in force per capita of the state with 
the lower level of CIE in the dyad; a high value of this measure indicates both states have 
impersonal economies. As can be seen, the coefficient for CIEL (-0.81) is negative and highly 
significant. This corroborates that impersonal economy is a highly robust force for peace. The 
coefficient for DemocracyL (0.02) is now in the positive direction, though not significant. There 
are no other differences between Models 1 and 2, whose samples are identical, and apart from 
Mousseau (2009), no one has examined any role for contract flows in the democratic peace. 
Therefore, the standard econometric inference to be drawn from Model 2 is the non-trivial result 
that all prior reports of democracy as a force for peace are probably spurious; a result predicted 
and fully accounted for by economic norms theory.  
CIEL and DemocracyL correlate only in the moderate range of 0.47 (Pearson’s r), so the 
insignificance of democracy is not likely to be a consequence of multicollinearity. This is 
corroborated by the variance inflation factor for DemocracyL in Model 2 of 1.45, which is well 
below the usual rule-of-thumb indicator of multicollinearity of 10 or more. Nor should readers 
assume most democratic dyads have both states with impersonal economies: while almost all 
nations with contract-intensive economies (as indicated with below-median values of CIE) are 
democratic (Polity >6) (Singapore is the only long-term exception), more than half—55%—of all 
democratic nation-years have personalist economies. At the dyadic level in this sample, this 
translates to 80 percent of democratic dyads (all dyads where DemocracyBinary6 = 1) have at least 
one state with a personalist economy. In other words, not only does Model 2 show no evidence of 
causation from democracy to peace (as reported in Mousseau 2009), but it also illustrates that this 
absence of democratic peace includes the vast majority—80 percent—of democratic dyad-years 
over the sample period.  
Nor is it likely that the causal arrow is reversed—with democracy being the ultimate cause 
of impersonal economy and peace. This is because correlations among independent variables are 
not calculated in the results of multivariate regressions: coefficients show only the effect of each 
variable after the potential effects of the others are excluded. If it was democracy that caused 
both impersonal economy and peace, then there would be some variance in DemocracyL 
remaining, after its partial correlation with CIEL is excluded, that links it directly with peace. The 
positive direction of the coefficient for DemocracyL informs us that no such direct effect exists 
(Blalock 1979, 473-474). 
Models 3 and 4 test for measurement and underspecification errors in Model 2. Model 3 
replaces the continuous democracy measure with the standard binary one (Polity2 >6), as 
suggested by Russett (2010: 201), citing Bayer and Bernhard (2010). As can be observed, the 
coefficient for CIEL (-0.79) remains negative and highly significant, while DemocracyBinary6 
(0.24) is in the positive (wrong) direction. Model 4 tests for the effect of DemocracyL if a control 
is added for mixed-polity dyads, as suggested by Russett (2010: 201). As can be seen, the 15 
 
coefficient for Regime Difference (0.06), gauged in standard form as the higher democracy score 
in the dyad minus DemocracyL, is positive and significant, confirming that regime mixed-polity 
dyads do indeed have more militarized conflict than other dyads.
8 Yet, the inclusion of this term 
has no effect on the results that concern us here: CIEL (-0.86) is now even more robust, and 
DemocracyL (0.04) is now even more robust in the positive (wrong) direction. Unreported, a 
substitution of DemocracyL with DemocracyBinary6 in this model yields a positive coefficient that 
is even significant at the 0.10 level using a one-tailed test. It thus appears that, if anything, 
democracy is a source for militarized conflict among nations, possibly a consequence of the in-
group/out-group politics of personalist democracy. In fact, this latter possibility may account for 
Mansfield and Snyder’s observation that newly-democratic regimes are more likely than other 
states to engage in foreign conflicts (2005), given that most nations experimenting with 
democracy tend to have personalist economies.   
As discussed above, analyses of fatal dispute onsets with the far stricter binary measure for 
democracy (Polity = 10), put forward by Dafoe (2011) in response to Mousseau (2009), yields 
perfect prediction, as does binary CIEL, causing quasi-complete separation and inconclusive 
results. Therefore Models 5 and 6 reports the results with DemocracyBinary10 in analyses of all 
militarized conflicts, not just fatal ones. As can be seen, the coefficient for DemocracyBinary10 (-
0.53), while negative, fails to reach significance. Model 6 examines the effect of this measure 
after taking into consideration Regime Difference. The coefficient for DemocracyBinary10 (-0.15) is 
now closer to zero. As mentioned, Models 1 through 4 were repeated (but unreported to save 
space) with analyses of all militarized interstate disputes, with identical results obtained. 
Therefore the conclusions reached by Mousseau (2009) are corroborated even with the most 
stringent measure of democracy, inclusion of Regime Difference, and across all specifications: 
the democratic peace appears spurious, with impersonal economy the more likely explanation for 
both democracy and the democratic peace.    
Table 2 examines if wealth and the free-market factors can account for the effect of 
impersonal economy. The first column reports the correlation of each factor with CIEL, showing 
that all of the correlations with CIEL are well below the rule-of-thumb danger zone of 0.70 or 
higher.
9 Nor does any variable in Table 2 yield a variance inflation factor above 1.75, which is 
well below the rule-of-thumb threshold of 10.  
As can be seen in Model 1, the coefficient for CIEL (-0.70) remains negative and highly 
significant even with control for WealthL (0.24), which is not significant. Most relatively wealthy 
states with personalist economies are communist regimes or oil-exporting states, both of which 
are often highly personalist regimes, with authorities distributing rents with partiality. Examples 
include Iraq, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the USSR.  
As can be seen in Model 2, the coefficient for CIEL (-0.62), while slightly smaller than it is in 
Model 1, is still highly robust with control added for TradeL (-1.46), which is also negative and 
significant. The significance of TradeL is reasonable: while economic norms theory predicts 
nations with impersonalist economies to trade more than other nations, as measured here 
following convention, TradeL indicates the extent at which the two economies in a dyad are 
interdependent, not the extent at which each one trades in the global economy. In addition, 16 
 
economic norms theory predicts market norms to cause advanced economy (Mousseau 2012a), 
which would work, ceteris paribus, to make impersonalist nations less dependent on the global 
economy. We should thus expect some correlation of CIEL and TradeL, but it is not inconsistent 
with the theory that TradeL  has an independent pacifying impact on militarized conflict in ways 
argued by Russett and Oneal (2001), as a factor that increases the cost of war, or by Gartzke et al. 
(2001), as a signaling mechanism. 
Model 3 examines if capital openness (Gartzke et al. 2001) can account for the impact of 
impersonal economy.
10 However, Choi (2011) and Dafoe (2011) report serious sample bias 
caused by listwise deletion of missing data in the variable Capital OpennessL. Analyses of this 
variable have suffered from ad hoc methods of (i) list-wise deletion (Gartzke 2007), which 
requires the missing data to be MCAR (missing completely at random) assumption and (ii) 
imputation of missing values with a zero (Gartzke and Hewitt 2010), which requires the 
contradictory MNAR (missing not at random) assumption. What is more, the missing data 
encompass almost half of the fatal dispute onset years (59 out of 126 onset years) over the period 
of 1966-1992, which may cause false positives in coefficient and standard error estimates if these 
values are assumed as zero by Gartzke and Hewitt (2010) or left as missing as done by Gartzke 
(2007).  
To lessen the biases inherent in these methods, I first interpolated the known values of 
Capital OpennessL and then, following Gartzke and Hewitt (2010), I replaced all the remaining 
missing values with a zero. This procedure shows that at least 2,194 missing observations are 
incorrectly coded as zero for this variable by Gartzke and Hewitt (2010), corresponding to 17% 
of the onset years (21 out of 126). Therefore, caution is necessary in analyses of this variable. As 
can be seen, the coefficient for CIEL (-0.61) holds firm, while the coefficient for Capital 
OpennessL (-0.12) is significant only at the lowest threshold. Additional tests of this same model 
and sample without CIEL, unreported, show Capital OpennessL to be highly significant (beta = -
0.20, se = 0.05, p = 0.000). In analyses of all (fatal and non-fatal) disputes Capital OpennessL is 
insignificant (beta = -0.06, se = 0.04, p = 0.111) after consideration of CIEL. With due caution in 
drawing inferences from this variable, it appears that impersonal economy may account for most 
of the impact of capital openness on conflict. Just as economic norms theory predicts increased 
trade among impersonal states, it also predicts capital openness. 
Model 4 examines if the size of public sector can account for the impact of impersonal 
economy. McDonald hypotheses that the size of public sector in only one state in a dyad will 
increase the probability of militarized conflict (2009: 84), an expectation that can be assessed at 
the dyadic level with the size of public sector of the state with the higher size, a variable I call 
PublicH. As can be seen, the coefficient for CIEL (-0.74) holds firm, while the coefficient for 
PublicH (-0.01) is significant but in the wrong direction—indicating that states with large public 
sectors are less likely than others to engage in fatal conflicts. Additional tests of this same model 
and sample with CIEL excluded, unreported to save space, show PublicH to be insignificant (beta 
= 0.00, se = 0.01, p = 0.648). The negative role for PublicH in conflict after controlling for CIEL 
may be a function of rivalries among bordering states with personalist economies, as many 
nations with personalist economies have small public sectors.
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Given the insignificance or weak significance of Capital OpennessL and PublicH in Models 3 
and 4, Model 2 in Table 2 yields the best non-theoretically-driven estimate of the causes of fatal 
international conflict (a true theory-driven estimate would exclude TradeL, which is partially 
predicted from CIEL). Calculations of the coefficients in this model indicate that impersonal 
economy is one of the most powerful factors in international politics: only the relatively trivial 
Contiguity and cubic spline variables (which control for temporal dependence and are not 
reported) have stronger impacts; CIEL is 20% stronger than the Realist variable Relative 
Capability and 61% stronger than TradeL. CIEL is also highly robust: even with all the democracy 
and free market variables put together in a common regression (unreported), the variable remains 
at the highest level of significance, with and without the variables that cause listwise deletion 
(Capital OpennessL and PublicH). The analyses thus confirm impersonal economy as a powerful 
force shaping international conflict processes, and neither free-market capitalism nor democracy 
appear as compelling factors in this regard. 
 
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 
This article has sought to address the controversy of whether the capitalist peace can explain the 
democratic peace. Whether or not a capitalist peace can account for the democratic peace 
depends on whether capitalism can account for democracy as well as peace (Blalock 1979:468-
474; Ray 2003). There are two kinds of capitalist peace theories: free-market models link smaller 
government with peace (Weede 1996; Gartzke et al. 2001; McDonald 2009); the social-market 
model links impersonal economy with peace (Mousseau 2000). Among these, only the social-
market model has been both theorized to account for both democracy and peace (ibid.) and 
shown to account for the democratic peace (Mousseau 2009; Choi 2011; Dafoe 2011).  
Some have pointed out several ways that the results of Mousseau (2009) may not pose a 
challenge to the democratic peace, and this article was aimed at examining these arguments. First, 
a new continuous measure of impersonal economy was introduced, solving the perfect prediction 
problem that results from the binary measure for social-market capitalism in analyses of fatal 
disputes. Second, all militarized conflicts, not just fatal ones, were examined in crucial tests, to 
see if the new binary maximum measure of democracy (Polity +10), put forward by Dafoe 
(2011), can save the democratic peace hypothesis. Third, tests included control for differences 
along the democracy-autocracy dimension. Finally, the robustness of the social-market economic 
peace was examined with consideration of measures of free-market capitalism. 
The results for democracy are clear and clean: once ―capitalist‖ impersonal economy is taken 
into account, there is no evidence of causation from democracy to peace; it is far more likely that 
impersonal economy accounts for both democracy and peace. The use of the highest +10 measure 
of democracy does not save the democratic peace hypothesis; and democracy remains 
insignificant with consideration of regime differences. All data and measures are conventional to 
studies of interstate conflict processes, and the most likely cause of democracy’s insignificance is 
consideration of impersonal economy, since key models are identical in every other way.  Nor 
can the social-market peace be explained by trade or wealth; and the free-market theories of 18 
 
capitalist peace, size of public sector (McDonald 2009) and capital openness (Gartzke et al. 2001; 
Gartzke 2007), do not survive rigorous testing or the consideration of impersonal economy at 
standard levels of significance.    
The results of this study must be made clear: there is no scientific justification for inferring or 
implying from this study any evidence, direct or indirect, of causation from democracy to peace. 
Furthermore, democracy is not merely insignificant: standard measures of democracy were 
shown to have positive impacts on the odds of militarized conflict in every model that controlled 
for contract flows, with the positive impact of binary (Polity >+6) democracy even reaching 
significance when regime difference is considered.  
Second, there is no justification for saving the democratic peace hypothesis on the contention 
that democracy and capitalism are the same thing. They are not: the variables correlate at only 
0.47, and, with their binary definitions, more than half—55%—of all democratic nation-years are 
with nations with personalist economies. At the dyadic level, this translates to 80 percent of 
democratic dyads have at least one state that has a personalist economy. The analyses thus 
showed that the vast majority—80 percent—of democratic dyads are, if anything, more likely 
than others to have militarized conflict. If these results do not lead to the inference that the 
democratic peace is probably spurious, I am not sure what can.  
Dafoe puts to paper a common confusion of cumulation with accumulation: ―as the number 
of studies supporting the descriptive inference of the democratic peace continues to grow, the 
probability of a future study overturning this finding becomes increasingly less likely‖ (2011:14). 
This is not scientifically correct: repeated studies with specification bias do not render a finding 
any more accurate than a single one. If it did, then scientific progress would collapse into a race 
of competing viewpoints over publication numbers; editors, rather than evidence, would emerge 
as the arbiters of truth.
12 While numerous studies have corroborated the democratic peace, not a 
single one of these studies controlled for impersonal economy, a proven powerful variable 
predicted by a new and highly corroborated theory. New ideas can always emerge, and there is no 
logic in resisting them simply because a prior view was widely accepted as fact: the world is not 
flat. 
With this study, there are several crucial tasks for the future. First and foremost, as with any 
study, the results here must be given careful scrutiny, and these data are available for anyone 
wishing to dissect them. Any found error is trivial, however, unless it is shown that, when 
corrected, democracy flips from positive back to negative and significant. It is conceivable that, 
with various tweaks of Model 5 in Table 1, which excludes control for Regime Difference, the 
highly stringent +10 democracy measure may be found minimally significant. But, absent some 
theoretical justification, a democratic peace that appears only without control for the high level of 
conflict in regime-mixed dyads would still be spurious. More importantly, all research must be 
assessed in the larger context with which it is embedded (Lakatos 1978[1970]: 87-88). Compared 
with most theories of democratic peace, economic norms theory has a much larger repertoire of 
explanatory value and predictive successes, crossing multiple levels of analyses.
13 Causation has 
also been traced in case studies, such as the Greek transition from personal to impersonal 
economy, and related changes in its domestic and foreign politics, in the 1990s (Mousseau 19 
 
2009:76-81); and Argentine and British motives to fight the Falklands/Malvinas War (Mousseau 
2012b). 
Second, it would be useful to pit specific measures from the most promising democratic 
peace theories against impersonal economy. For instance, selectorate theory (Bueno de Mesquita 
et al. 1999) may still be robust, when selectorates are measured directly, against impersonal 
economy. Also, stable borders that may cause both democracy and peace (Gibler 2012; Rasler 
and Thompson 2005) may yet be found robust after consideration of impersonal economy. Stable 
borders may even be a cause of impersonal economy—and thus have the potential to render the 
social-market peace spurious. Finally, some other third variable could cause both contract flows 
and peace. All that can be said as of this writing is that the cumulative state of evidence is that 
democracy is not a likely cause of peace among nations: impersonal economy is the more likely 
cause of both democracy and peace. 
If the results of this study remain unchallenged, then the democratic peace research program 
must go through a substantial transformation. In Lakatosian philosophy of science, the social-
market economic peace can be viewed as an emendation to the democratic peace research 
program, adding heuristic power through its explanation of the causes of both democracy and 
peace, while receiving both corroboration of its novel content and excess corroboration over 
previous explanations. Imre Lakatos (1978[1970]) explicitly identifies examples of inconsistent 
theories being grafted onto existing research programs, eventually overtaking the original 
programs. This is constitutive of a progressive problem-shift, while in some interpretations it 
could even be conceived of as an ideal form (Ungerer 2012). With such a shift there is potential 
for a great deal of progress, with a wide open frontier of promising research needed on the 
possible causes of both impersonal economy and its precise linkages with both peace and 
cooperation, within and among nations; the field is also wide open for modeling strategic 
interactions in various economic kinds of dyads and, among nations with impersonal economies, 
collective action problems in their management and preservation of the global economy. 
Finally, this study carries direct implications for public policy: if democracy is not a cause of 
peace, then there is no point in promoting democracy with the goal of achieving peace, as did 
both the Clinton and W. Bush U.S. Administrations. Instead, peace follows from impersonal 
economy—the condition when most citizens in a nation have free choice in the marketplace for 
obtaining their incomes, goods, and services. This means the capitalist powers are best advised to 
go back to the policies the Truman Administration adopted intuitively for post-war WWII 
Europe: helping most citizens obtain a stake in the impersonal market by making opportunities in 
it widely available. In this way economic norms theory informs us that it is politics that 
determines economics, and it is up to political leaders to make the decisions to do whatever it 
takes to make sure most citizens can normally find jobs in the marketplace. Anywhere this is 
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Table 1. Capitalist Peace versus Democratic Peace in Analyses of Militarized Interstate 
Disputes, 1961 to 2001
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Variables  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
 
Model 5  Model 6 
Contract-intensive   - 
 
-0.81 
***  -0.79 
***  -0.86 
***  -0.25 
**  -0.26 
** 











  DemocracyL  -0.06 






































































  Regime difference




















   
 
0.01 
  Relative capability
b  -0.26 
**  -0.32 
***  -0.32 
***  -0.31 
***  -0.30 














  Major power
c  1.31 
**  1.67 
***  1.66 
***  1.55 
***  1.87 















d  3.51 
***  3.46 
***  3.45 
***  3.59 
***  2.48 















e  -0.45 
***  -0.54 
***  -0.54 
***  -0.54 
***  -0.41 














  Number of states
f  0.00 
 
-0.01 
t  0.00 
 
0.00 

















































  Observations  321,568  321,568  321,568  321,568  321,811  321,811 
±Standard errors, corrected for clustering by dyad, in second row of each cell.  
*** p < 0.001, 
** p < 0.01,
* p < 0.05, 
t p < 0.10.  
All independent variables lagged one year. Peace years and cubic spline variables, calculated separately 
for fatal and all disputes with consideration for disputes back to the start of the Cold War in 1947, not 
shown for reasons of space. 
aPolity2 higher minus Polity2 lower, Polity IV data (Marshall and Jaggers 2003). 
bCOW Index of National Capability, higher/lower (logged+1) (Singer et al. 1972). 
cAt least one state is a major power (Small and Singer 1982). 
dStates are separated by less than 400 miles of water (Stinnett et al. 2002). 
eInter-capital distance (logged+1). 
fNumber of states in system. 
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Table 2. Tests for Spuriousness in the Market-Capitalist Peace, Fatal Militarized Interstate 






CIEL   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
CIEL  1.00  -0.70 
***  -0.62 
***  -0.61 





























b  0.31  - 
 
-1.46 












  Capital opennessL





t  - 
 

























  Relative capability  0.01  -0.31 
**  -0.37 
***  -0.31 
**  -0.14 
 








  Major power  0.13  1.73 
***  1.86 
***  1.24 
*  0.89 
 








  Contiguity  0.07  3.49 
***  3.52 
***  3.55 
***  4.25 
*** 








  Distance  -0.04  -0.55 
***  -0.58 
***  -0.54 
***  -0.32 
* 













*  -0.02 
* 















**  -0.15 
  Psuedo LL 
 
-1045  -1019  -631  -264 
Psuedo R square 
 
0.38  0.38  0.40  0.43 
Observations 
 
328,181  323,080  206,800  123,626 
±Standard errors, corrected for clustering by dyad, in second row of each cell.  
*** p < 0.001, 
** p < 0.01,
* p < 0.05, 
t p < 0.10.  
All independent variables lagged one year. Peace years and cubic spline variables not shown.
 
aEnergy consumption per capita logged, COW Index of National Capability (Singer et al. 1972). 
b(Exportsij+importsij)/GDPi, lower (Gleditsch 2002).  
cIndex of government restrictions on foreign exchange, current, and capital accounts, lower  (Gartzke 
2007:174). 
dProportion of state revenue from non-tax sources, higher of both states in the dyad (McDonald 
2009: 79). 
 




                                                 
1 To date, empirical corroboration of novel facts includes: the economic conditionality to the 
democratic peace (Mousseau 2000); cooperation (Mousseau 2002) and common preferences 
(Mousseau 2003) among nations; variance in social trust within nations (Mousseau 2009: 61), 
state respect for human rights (Mousseau and Mousseau 2008), public support for terrorism 
(Mousseau 2011), and the onset of civil wars (Mousseau 2012a). 
2 For the most recent comprehensive review of the democratic peace literature, see Ungerer 
(2012). 
3 Nothing is said here regarding actions that have costs, so there can be no collective goods 
dilemma resulting from the predicted change in preferences. 
4 The primary exception to this general rule would be cases where rent-seeking supporters of a 
personalist state rely on exports. Usually this involves natural resource exports, such as oil. Even 
in these cases, however, the personalist state is usually concerned narrowly on the specific market 
for the particular export, not the general vitality of the global market. 
5 Specifically, I obtained the Dyadic Militarized Interstate Disputes Dataset, ver. 1.1 (Maoz 
2005).  
6 That is, in the Polity IV democracy data (Marshall and Jaggers 2003), and the Penn World 
Tables data (Heston et al. 2002) with populations greater than 500,000.   
7 Details in the construction of the imputed data can be reviewed and replicated at http://author. 
All results in Tables 1 and 2 below are identical using the original non-imputed data with missing 
values deleted. 
8See Choi (2011, 783-784) for superiority of the Regime Difference measure over DemocracyH, 
the higher democracy score in a dyad, which nullifies the purpose of the weak link assumption 
and leads to a biased estimation of DemocracyL. 
9 Wealth is gauged using energy consumption per capita. Results are identical using gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita, but energy consumption is preferred because GDP and CIE 
are axiomatically related as GDP is partly constructed from data on contract flows reported to 
government agencies. We should refrain from including variables that are axiomatically-related 
in common regressions (Ray 2003). Also, because GDP is partly constructed from data on 
contract flows it is comparatively biased towards impersonal economy. As expected, CIEL 
correlates with GDP a bit higher at 0.71. 
10 I thank Erik Gartzke and Patrick McDonald for kindly sending me their data. 
11 Putting all variables in Table 2 in a common regression yields a sample reduced by 73% due to 
severe data limitations caused by the variables Capital OpennessL and PublicH. Nevertheless, 
CIEL is negative and highly robust even in this very small, biased, and crowded sample 
(unreported). 
12 Of course, some of this might be going on anyway, as highlighted by Kuhn (1960). 
13 See footnote 1. 